Monday, December 18, 2006
Blogger has moved
For anyone who may stumble across this blog in their surfings, Sartre-is-smartre has moved the majority of his new postings to a different web log. The url for the new blog, Being and Nothingness, is the following: http://lover-of-wisdom.blogspot.com/
Wednesday, December 6, 2006
CUSA goes pro-choice
While it must dismay the conservative cro-magnons behind the publication of the Ottawa Citizen and other local corporate-owned media cronies, last night the Carleton University Students Association (CUSA) passed a motion making the student council a pro-choice body. This was in response to anti-abortion lobbyist groups applying for student funds in order to run a chapter of Lifeline on campus. Lifeline is a group dedicated to the end of legal abortion in Canada.
Recent headlines in local papers like the Shitizen, sorry, pardon me, Citizen (hey this is a blog after all, I am allowed some colloquialisms) have portrayed the motion as a sign that CUSA is against free speech. While the Citizen must be congratulating themselves on selecting the new mayor of Ottawa by acting as Mr. Obrien’s personal campaign advertising platform, perhaps it is time for the Citizen and other corporate owned media outlets to recognize that while they can buy elections and select our governments in the modern MTV anti-intellectual culture of the west, universities are still separate entities which can act in a progressive manner even if the rest of society is moving towards a Dark age.
The Ottawa Citizen is owned by Canwest Global Corporation. In the same way that massive corporations may own both a tobacco company as well as a pharmaceutical company which manufactures cancer fighting drugs, or others may own interests in a arms manufacturer as well as a medical supply company, corporations have also taken over much of our media outlets in order to affect popular opinion in a manner that is beneficial to capitalist interests. Martin Newland, a prominent journalist who has written for the National Post, the Daily Telegraph, the Daily Mail and the Guardian, spoke recently at Carleton University about this decline in the quality and integrity of media outlets. It is important that those in society who recognize this amalgamation of power among a small social elite speak their minds loudly while they still can.
In regards to the motion to make CUSA a pro-choice body, this in no way affects freedom of speech. Backward evangelical groups such as Lifeline still may come on campus and spew their vitriolic views as much as they like, they just cannot do so by being funded by student dollars. Since Canadian society currently sanctions abortion as a legal activity, having Carleton student funds go to a group whose primary goal is making abortion illegal and attempts to spread its message by intimidation of women on campus would be an irresponsible act on the part of CUSA.
And besides, as has already been stated, while the Ottawa Citizen and other corporate owned media outlets may continue to buy elections, buy government policy, and buy the sanctioning of continued environmental degradation in order for a select few to make a profit, this does not mean that their influence immediately moves into the sphere of Carleton University’s affairs. Thankfully this is still one segment of Canadian society that has not been sold to the highest bidder. Not yet at least.
Congratulations on CUSA for doing the right thing. And Lifeline? Perhaps your efforts would be better spent in a more authoritarian state which holds similar views towards women’s rights, states such as the United States of America or Saudi Arabia.
Recent headlines in local papers like the Shitizen, sorry, pardon me, Citizen (hey this is a blog after all, I am allowed some colloquialisms) have portrayed the motion as a sign that CUSA is against free speech. While the Citizen must be congratulating themselves on selecting the new mayor of Ottawa by acting as Mr. Obrien’s personal campaign advertising platform, perhaps it is time for the Citizen and other corporate owned media outlets to recognize that while they can buy elections and select our governments in the modern MTV anti-intellectual culture of the west, universities are still separate entities which can act in a progressive manner even if the rest of society is moving towards a Dark age.
The Ottawa Citizen is owned by Canwest Global Corporation. In the same way that massive corporations may own both a tobacco company as well as a pharmaceutical company which manufactures cancer fighting drugs, or others may own interests in a arms manufacturer as well as a medical supply company, corporations have also taken over much of our media outlets in order to affect popular opinion in a manner that is beneficial to capitalist interests. Martin Newland, a prominent journalist who has written for the National Post, the Daily Telegraph, the Daily Mail and the Guardian, spoke recently at Carleton University about this decline in the quality and integrity of media outlets. It is important that those in society who recognize this amalgamation of power among a small social elite speak their minds loudly while they still can.
In regards to the motion to make CUSA a pro-choice body, this in no way affects freedom of speech. Backward evangelical groups such as Lifeline still may come on campus and spew their vitriolic views as much as they like, they just cannot do so by being funded by student dollars. Since Canadian society currently sanctions abortion as a legal activity, having Carleton student funds go to a group whose primary goal is making abortion illegal and attempts to spread its message by intimidation of women on campus would be an irresponsible act on the part of CUSA.
And besides, as has already been stated, while the Ottawa Citizen and other corporate owned media outlets may continue to buy elections, buy government policy, and buy the sanctioning of continued environmental degradation in order for a select few to make a profit, this does not mean that their influence immediately moves into the sphere of Carleton University’s affairs. Thankfully this is still one segment of Canadian society that has not been sold to the highest bidder. Not yet at least.
Congratulations on CUSA for doing the right thing. And Lifeline? Perhaps your efforts would be better spent in a more authoritarian state which holds similar views towards women’s rights, states such as the United States of America or Saudi Arabia.
Saturday, December 2, 2006
How Stephen Harper decided the Liberal leadership race
The drama in Canadian federal politics continues to thrill. With the aid of the former supporters of Gerard Kennedy and Martha Hall Findlay, Stephane Dion leapt ahead of Michael Ignatieff to become the new Liberal party leader on Saturday.
This move to the left was perhaps to be expected. After Jean Chretien's dynasty of majority governments, the Paul Martin Liberals failed to inspire Canadian voters. In the end it was Dion who defeated the well organized campaign of Ignatieff. Dion was instrumental in the drafting of the Clarity Act under the Chretien administration, which set clear rules regarding secession in the aftermath of the last Quebec referendum, . His ascension to power should cause Canadians to recognize that the influence of Chretienites in the Liberal party has returned in full force.
Given recent developments in Canadian politics, this leadership decision is not a surprise. The decision by Stephen Harper to threaten an opening of the constitutional debate in order to attract Quebec voters was an overwhelming influence. With the spectre of Canadian politics becoming dominated by the national unity issue in the forseeable future, it was perhaps necessary to once again return to a leader from Quebec.
Dion now has the enviable position of being the primary alternative for the majority of Canadian voters at a time when the Conservative party's poll numbers have been falling. It is clear that Dion has decided to run on a message of environmental stewardship. Whether this will be the issue to inspire Canadians to return to a Liberal majority in the upcoming federal election is yet to be seen.
The question whether Stephane Dion has the leadership skills to defeat Stephen Harper will have to be answered relatively soon. Many Canadians will be interested in watching Dion's performance in question period for a possible indication of his leadership style.
What we do know is that Canadians are lame for having the two leaders of the dominant parties named Stephen and Stephane.
This move to the left was perhaps to be expected. After Jean Chretien's dynasty of majority governments, the Paul Martin Liberals failed to inspire Canadian voters. In the end it was Dion who defeated the well organized campaign of Ignatieff. Dion was instrumental in the drafting of the Clarity Act under the Chretien administration, which set clear rules regarding secession in the aftermath of the last Quebec referendum, . His ascension to power should cause Canadians to recognize that the influence of Chretienites in the Liberal party has returned in full force.
Given recent developments in Canadian politics, this leadership decision is not a surprise. The decision by Stephen Harper to threaten an opening of the constitutional debate in order to attract Quebec voters was an overwhelming influence. With the spectre of Canadian politics becoming dominated by the national unity issue in the forseeable future, it was perhaps necessary to once again return to a leader from Quebec.
Dion now has the enviable position of being the primary alternative for the majority of Canadian voters at a time when the Conservative party's poll numbers have been falling. It is clear that Dion has decided to run on a message of environmental stewardship. Whether this will be the issue to inspire Canadians to return to a Liberal majority in the upcoming federal election is yet to be seen.
The question whether Stephane Dion has the leadership skills to defeat Stephen Harper will have to be answered relatively soon. Many Canadians will be interested in watching Dion's performance in question period for a possible indication of his leadership style.
What we do know is that Canadians are lame for having the two leaders of the dominant parties named Stephen and Stephane.
What is it that One sees in the Art of Another?
While studying for an upcoming exam, I took the time today for a bit of daydreaming. I was looking at a slide of the interior of Borromini’s San Carlo alle Quattro Fontane when I began to wonder just what it is that one finds pleasurable by observing architecture, works of fine art, literature, and poetry. I mean besides the formal qualities of the work, what is there that humans find appealing?
I began to think that for myself anyways, when I look at an artistic expression of an individual it seems to me that for the first time I am given a true glance into the consciousness of that individual. Think about this for a moment. When are we ever truly given such moments of understanding between two individuals? One could live for thirty years with a significant other and still could not ever come close to understanding exactly what the other’s experience of reality means to them. Such things are not transferable through concrete means it would seem; rather they are best conveyed through our creative faculties.
Someone may point out that San Carlo is most definitely a concrete object, but this would be misinterpreting the meaning of what is being said here. The experience of standing in the interior of such a building, it is the space that one experiences not the concrete object which defines that space. In this sense the undulating lines and focus on ovals and triangles which are seen in Borromini’s work creates a definitive feeling of space being pushed and pulled for the individual standing within them. The originality of Borromini perhaps reflects the character of what we know from historical texts was a dark and disturbed individual; the introverted and troubled artist who eventually committed suicide.
Could Borromini have expressed his torment in any superior form than what is seen in his architecture? It could be put forward that he could have simply written what he felt down and had others read what had been expressed. However such words can only express ideas, meaningless and general words such as anger and sadness. These words are useless for our true comprehension of what is being felt, for who has ever experienced only one kind of anger and one kind of sadness? Every experience of emotion is different than the last in some significant form.
This perhaps is at least partially behind what the value of art means to us. A good poem never says in a straight forward manner what is trying to be expressed, it must achieve an expression through the abstraction of language. In the same way architecture, the fine arts and other great works of literature may be understood as giving us true glimpses into the minds of other conscious individuals. Perhaps it is the realization of understanding those consciousnesses that is in some way appealing to us as sentient beings.
I began to think that for myself anyways, when I look at an artistic expression of an individual it seems to me that for the first time I am given a true glance into the consciousness of that individual. Think about this for a moment. When are we ever truly given such moments of understanding between two individuals? One could live for thirty years with a significant other and still could not ever come close to understanding exactly what the other’s experience of reality means to them. Such things are not transferable through concrete means it would seem; rather they are best conveyed through our creative faculties.
Someone may point out that San Carlo is most definitely a concrete object, but this would be misinterpreting the meaning of what is being said here. The experience of standing in the interior of such a building, it is the space that one experiences not the concrete object which defines that space. In this sense the undulating lines and focus on ovals and triangles which are seen in Borromini’s work creates a definitive feeling of space being pushed and pulled for the individual standing within them. The originality of Borromini perhaps reflects the character of what we know from historical texts was a dark and disturbed individual; the introverted and troubled artist who eventually committed suicide.
Could Borromini have expressed his torment in any superior form than what is seen in his architecture? It could be put forward that he could have simply written what he felt down and had others read what had been expressed. However such words can only express ideas, meaningless and general words such as anger and sadness. These words are useless for our true comprehension of what is being felt, for who has ever experienced only one kind of anger and one kind of sadness? Every experience of emotion is different than the last in some significant form.
This perhaps is at least partially behind what the value of art means to us. A good poem never says in a straight forward manner what is trying to be expressed, it must achieve an expression through the abstraction of language. In the same way architecture, the fine arts and other great works of literature may be understood as giving us true glimpses into the minds of other conscious individuals. Perhaps it is the realization of understanding those consciousnesses that is in some way appealing to us as sentient beings.
An Investigation of the Notion of the Free Will
The idea of a free will is once again popular in modern times. With the advent of existentialist thought, many humans once again tend to view themselves as being creators of their own destiny.
Immanuel Kant was also fond of the notion of a free will, while others such as Hume were highly suspect. Thinkers like Hume believed that every thought in an individuals mind is simply the result of previous experience. In this way we are said to not be free to make choices in the conventional sense, rather it is proposed that we have been conditioned to respond to any given situation by reason of our past experiences.
Today I wish to put forward Kant's notion of the free will, while on another day I will attempt to better elucidate the opposing views regarding the human will.
Kant’s notion of a kingdom of ends in which rational beings at once legislate principles and subject themselves to those principles grows out of Kant’s notion of an autonomous rational free will and the idea of pre-existing moral principles. Kant believed that it is only through the autonomy of the will that rational beings as opposed to natural beings are ends in themselves with dignity and entitled to respect. This conception of the kingdom of ends grows out of Kant’s claim that natural beings which are affected only by their inclinations are not capable of acting in a moral manner, and that autonomy of the will is required for there to even be such a thing as genuine morality. Kant reconciles the fact that all natural events have prior, natural and determining causes with the possibility of morality by suggesting the existence of a free cause which exists outside of but acts upon nature; the rational free will.
Kant’s notion of a kingdom of ends is posed as a community in which, “every rational being should treat himself and all others never merely as a means but always at the same time as an end in himself.” Because Kant suggested that one is autonomous or free only if one is the author of the laws to which one is subject, he believed that as rational beings all of our wills are identical in terms of the universally applicable moral law, and in this manner any universal law one may lay down and impose upon others will automatically be accepted so far as we are all rational beings. Here Kant is proposing a convergence of wills, each member of the kingdom of ends is both legislator and subject to the universal moral laws we create. Since laws determine the ends as regards their universal validity, if one abstracts away from the personal differences of rational beings and also from all content of their private ends, then it will be possible to think of a whole of ends in systematic connection. This springs from Kant’s idea that one should treat rational beings never as a means but only as an end in itself. This belief Kant states when he writes that, “man, and in general every rational being, exists as an end in himself and not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will.”
An example of what Kant means here is the idea of a promise. The reason why we must respect a promise from Kant’s notion is not because we may face negative consequences; rather it is because we must respect other people as ends in themselves out of our respect for duty to moral law. By this logic the kingdom of ends is one in which all rational beings respect each other as ends in themselves. This is due to rational beings possessing a free will and because of this feature, such beings are entitled to respect and dignity.
As already stated, Kant saw rational beings as being ends in themselves with dignity and entitled to respect. This is evident in his notion of natural beings as subject only to their inclinations while rational beings are subject to both natural inclinations as well as the free will. Kant believed that morality can not even exist without the application of reason; this is clear when he states the following:
"And how could laws for the determination of our will be regarded as laws for the determination of a rational being in general and of ourselves only insofar as we are rational beings, if these laws were merely empirical and did not have their source completely a priori in pure, but practical, reason?"
Because of the need for reason in order for one to be moral, Kant says that, “morality and humanity, insofar as it is capable of morality, alone have dignity.” Kant believed that other means such as skill and diligence in work have a market value, and characteristics such as wit, lively imagination, and humour have an affective price; but fidelity to promises and benevolence based on principles, i.e. moral behaviour, have intrinsic worth. Skills and other attributes here are presented merely as means to other ends, moral behaviours being ends in themselves.
Kant’s notion of morality being conditional upon the existence of the rational free will, and that only rational beings are able to act in a moral manner, leads to the proposition of free causes which exist outside of nature but which affect nature. Natural events all have natural, prior determining causes. This can be witnessed when one kicks a soccer ball and the ball moves in accord to the amount of force used. Kant suggests the notion of free causes in order to explain the possibility of morality as an a priori principle, the rational will which acts freely. Kant writes that, “the will is a kind of causality belonging to living beings insofar as they are rational; freedom would be the property of this causality that makes it effective independent of any determination by alien causes.” The existence of the free will is something which can not be proved Kant believes, however it is necessary if one is to suggest the existence of a priori moral principles. Kant believes that the free will exists somehow outside of nature but acts upon nature. This somewhat supernatural nature of the free will Kant expresses when he writes that the free will, “must, rather, be a causality in accordance with immutable laws, which, to be sure, is of a special kind; otherwise a free will would be something absurd.” In order for the idea of pre-existing moral principles to make any sense, Kant believes that the rational free will is a necessity, although its existence can never be proven.
Kant’s notion of a kingdom of ends in which all rational beings treat each other not as means but as ends in themselves grows out of Kant’s notion of an autonomous rational free will and the principle of the pre-existing moral principles. Due to Kant’s belief that reason is a necessity for moral acts to occur, he believes that only rational beings as opposed to natural beings are ends in themselves with dignity and entitled to respect. This idea grows out of Kant’s notion of rational beings possessing a free will and that this will exists outside of nature but has an affect upon nature.
The main question which should jump out at any reader would be the notion of a free cause as existing outside of nature. This is perhaps Kant's greatest flaw and yet in modernity it is generally accepted by the average public that such free wills exist. In fact, for most individuals the very idea that we lack a free will seems even more absurd than the idea of a supernatural free causing will which exists separate from that which it acts upon. If we were to see a soccer ball suddenly move seemingly by itself, i.e. by a free cause rather than a foot kicking the ball, we would be completely stunned by such an action. And yet for most this is exactly what we accept as occurring when we go about our daily lives interacting with reality. Most individuals believe they are acting freely and making choices in their daily lives, but when one contemplates the philosophical problems inherant with such a belief the matter no longer seems as clear cut a proposition as it previously did.
Immanuel Kant was also fond of the notion of a free will, while others such as Hume were highly suspect. Thinkers like Hume believed that every thought in an individuals mind is simply the result of previous experience. In this way we are said to not be free to make choices in the conventional sense, rather it is proposed that we have been conditioned to respond to any given situation by reason of our past experiences.
Today I wish to put forward Kant's notion of the free will, while on another day I will attempt to better elucidate the opposing views regarding the human will.
Kant’s notion of a kingdom of ends in which rational beings at once legislate principles and subject themselves to those principles grows out of Kant’s notion of an autonomous rational free will and the idea of pre-existing moral principles. Kant believed that it is only through the autonomy of the will that rational beings as opposed to natural beings are ends in themselves with dignity and entitled to respect. This conception of the kingdom of ends grows out of Kant’s claim that natural beings which are affected only by their inclinations are not capable of acting in a moral manner, and that autonomy of the will is required for there to even be such a thing as genuine morality. Kant reconciles the fact that all natural events have prior, natural and determining causes with the possibility of morality by suggesting the existence of a free cause which exists outside of but acts upon nature; the rational free will.
Kant’s notion of a kingdom of ends is posed as a community in which, “every rational being should treat himself and all others never merely as a means but always at the same time as an end in himself.” Because Kant suggested that one is autonomous or free only if one is the author of the laws to which one is subject, he believed that as rational beings all of our wills are identical in terms of the universally applicable moral law, and in this manner any universal law one may lay down and impose upon others will automatically be accepted so far as we are all rational beings. Here Kant is proposing a convergence of wills, each member of the kingdom of ends is both legislator and subject to the universal moral laws we create. Since laws determine the ends as regards their universal validity, if one abstracts away from the personal differences of rational beings and also from all content of their private ends, then it will be possible to think of a whole of ends in systematic connection. This springs from Kant’s idea that one should treat rational beings never as a means but only as an end in itself. This belief Kant states when he writes that, “man, and in general every rational being, exists as an end in himself and not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will.”
An example of what Kant means here is the idea of a promise. The reason why we must respect a promise from Kant’s notion is not because we may face negative consequences; rather it is because we must respect other people as ends in themselves out of our respect for duty to moral law. By this logic the kingdom of ends is one in which all rational beings respect each other as ends in themselves. This is due to rational beings possessing a free will and because of this feature, such beings are entitled to respect and dignity.
As already stated, Kant saw rational beings as being ends in themselves with dignity and entitled to respect. This is evident in his notion of natural beings as subject only to their inclinations while rational beings are subject to both natural inclinations as well as the free will. Kant believed that morality can not even exist without the application of reason; this is clear when he states the following:
"And how could laws for the determination of our will be regarded as laws for the determination of a rational being in general and of ourselves only insofar as we are rational beings, if these laws were merely empirical and did not have their source completely a priori in pure, but practical, reason?"
Because of the need for reason in order for one to be moral, Kant says that, “morality and humanity, insofar as it is capable of morality, alone have dignity.” Kant believed that other means such as skill and diligence in work have a market value, and characteristics such as wit, lively imagination, and humour have an affective price; but fidelity to promises and benevolence based on principles, i.e. moral behaviour, have intrinsic worth. Skills and other attributes here are presented merely as means to other ends, moral behaviours being ends in themselves.
Kant’s notion of morality being conditional upon the existence of the rational free will, and that only rational beings are able to act in a moral manner, leads to the proposition of free causes which exist outside of nature but which affect nature. Natural events all have natural, prior determining causes. This can be witnessed when one kicks a soccer ball and the ball moves in accord to the amount of force used. Kant suggests the notion of free causes in order to explain the possibility of morality as an a priori principle, the rational will which acts freely. Kant writes that, “the will is a kind of causality belonging to living beings insofar as they are rational; freedom would be the property of this causality that makes it effective independent of any determination by alien causes.” The existence of the free will is something which can not be proved Kant believes, however it is necessary if one is to suggest the existence of a priori moral principles. Kant believes that the free will exists somehow outside of nature but acts upon nature. This somewhat supernatural nature of the free will Kant expresses when he writes that the free will, “must, rather, be a causality in accordance with immutable laws, which, to be sure, is of a special kind; otherwise a free will would be something absurd.” In order for the idea of pre-existing moral principles to make any sense, Kant believes that the rational free will is a necessity, although its existence can never be proven.
Kant’s notion of a kingdom of ends in which all rational beings treat each other not as means but as ends in themselves grows out of Kant’s notion of an autonomous rational free will and the principle of the pre-existing moral principles. Due to Kant’s belief that reason is a necessity for moral acts to occur, he believes that only rational beings as opposed to natural beings are ends in themselves with dignity and entitled to respect. This idea grows out of Kant’s notion of rational beings possessing a free will and that this will exists outside of nature but has an affect upon nature.
The main question which should jump out at any reader would be the notion of a free cause as existing outside of nature. This is perhaps Kant's greatest flaw and yet in modernity it is generally accepted by the average public that such free wills exist. In fact, for most individuals the very idea that we lack a free will seems even more absurd than the idea of a supernatural free causing will which exists separate from that which it acts upon. If we were to see a soccer ball suddenly move seemingly by itself, i.e. by a free cause rather than a foot kicking the ball, we would be completely stunned by such an action. And yet for most this is exactly what we accept as occurring when we go about our daily lives interacting with reality. Most individuals believe they are acting freely and making choices in their daily lives, but when one contemplates the philosophical problems inherant with such a belief the matter no longer seems as clear cut a proposition as it previously did.
Friday, December 1, 2006
On the Ontology of Music
It is generally accepted that one of the recognizable traits of a philosopher is the ability to think outside of social convention. Perhaps this propensity for abstract thought is best displayed in the debate among Nominalists and Realists in terms of musical expression. The central question in this debate is whether music is created or discovered by the author of a piece.
The general acceptance in society is that musical works are created by their authors. When Bach wrote his cello suite No. 5 in C minor most believed he was composing the work, hence why we tend to view musical artists as inspired geniuses. Among some philosophers there exists an opposing view: that musical works are discovered rather than created. Such a belief is referred to as Realism while those who believe that music is created are referred to as Nominalists. For the Nominalist then, no musical work exists beyond musical scores and performances. For the Realist, there is something beyond scores and performances in music that exists separately from tokens of the work. Here the word token is being used to describe any performance of a given work in the way that a token is any particular specimen of a particular class. Tokens of a musical are of a particular type; in the same way that there may be found many red things but there exists also redness in itself. So for music, there may be many different tokens of a given type. An example would be the different performances (or tokens) of the type “Tiny Dancer” by Elton John and the Foo Fighters.
Plato believed that objects experienced in the world were not in fact real; he believed they were copies of the perfect forms which existed, in a way, separately from our reality. In this way for Plato a chair is an inferior copy of the perfect form of a chair. This may be thought of along the same lines as what many hardcore Realists believe in terms of music; that a musical work pre-exists its composer and that it would continue to exist in some fashion even if all recordings and scores of the work were destroyed and forgotten.
To better understand this concept perhaps we need to discuss what makes a musical work. Are performances the same as the work or are they instances of the work? What makes a performance a performance of a work? Does one have to adhere perfectly to the score? Such hard-line interpretations seem to reflect a misunderstanding of the nature of musical scores; they are not clear cut instructions for playing a song but rather should be thought of in a similar fashion to a road map. A road map cannot give one a detailed explanation of their trip, only a guideline of how to arrive at one’s destination. Many Nominalists believe that there are only performances of a score, and that the score links performances of a work. This strict interpretation seems counter-intuitive however, for this would mean that a single error in performing the score would not be a performance of that work. As already mentioned this is not the manner in which musicians use a score.
For Realists, universals really do exist. They believe that any performance of a work is simply a token of a given type, and that type may be thought of in a fashion similar to Plato’s perfect forms. In this sense for Realists, a composer does not write a song; rather they discover the pre-existing type and bring it into our existence.
The ideas of the Realists do seem bizarre upon first glance. When thought of in greater detail however, one quickly realizes how difficult this debate becomes. Questions regarding the individuation of music arise, what makes the poem or song the thing that it is? Then there is the issue of numerical identity in music, when do we have one thing and when do we have more than one thing? Finally, one would assume that in order to better approach the ontology of music one would first have to tackle the nature of art works; what sort of thing is an artwork? Is a song a material object or something else?
It is interesting to note that among current philosophical circles it is the Realists who are winning the debate, although personally I do have reservations about the view. At any rate the discussion is far from being resolved and will likely continue for some time into the future.
The general acceptance in society is that musical works are created by their authors. When Bach wrote his cello suite No. 5 in C minor most believed he was composing the work, hence why we tend to view musical artists as inspired geniuses. Among some philosophers there exists an opposing view: that musical works are discovered rather than created. Such a belief is referred to as Realism while those who believe that music is created are referred to as Nominalists. For the Nominalist then, no musical work exists beyond musical scores and performances. For the Realist, there is something beyond scores and performances in music that exists separately from tokens of the work. Here the word token is being used to describe any performance of a given work in the way that a token is any particular specimen of a particular class. Tokens of a musical are of a particular type; in the same way that there may be found many red things but there exists also redness in itself. So for music, there may be many different tokens of a given type. An example would be the different performances (or tokens) of the type “Tiny Dancer” by Elton John and the Foo Fighters.
Plato believed that objects experienced in the world were not in fact real; he believed they were copies of the perfect forms which existed, in a way, separately from our reality. In this way for Plato a chair is an inferior copy of the perfect form of a chair. This may be thought of along the same lines as what many hardcore Realists believe in terms of music; that a musical work pre-exists its composer and that it would continue to exist in some fashion even if all recordings and scores of the work were destroyed and forgotten.
To better understand this concept perhaps we need to discuss what makes a musical work. Are performances the same as the work or are they instances of the work? What makes a performance a performance of a work? Does one have to adhere perfectly to the score? Such hard-line interpretations seem to reflect a misunderstanding of the nature of musical scores; they are not clear cut instructions for playing a song but rather should be thought of in a similar fashion to a road map. A road map cannot give one a detailed explanation of their trip, only a guideline of how to arrive at one’s destination. Many Nominalists believe that there are only performances of a score, and that the score links performances of a work. This strict interpretation seems counter-intuitive however, for this would mean that a single error in performing the score would not be a performance of that work. As already mentioned this is not the manner in which musicians use a score.
For Realists, universals really do exist. They believe that any performance of a work is simply a token of a given type, and that type may be thought of in a fashion similar to Plato’s perfect forms. In this sense for Realists, a composer does not write a song; rather they discover the pre-existing type and bring it into our existence.
The ideas of the Realists do seem bizarre upon first glance. When thought of in greater detail however, one quickly realizes how difficult this debate becomes. Questions regarding the individuation of music arise, what makes the poem or song the thing that it is? Then there is the issue of numerical identity in music, when do we have one thing and when do we have more than one thing? Finally, one would assume that in order to better approach the ontology of music one would first have to tackle the nature of art works; what sort of thing is an artwork? Is a song a material object or something else?
It is interesting to note that among current philosophical circles it is the Realists who are winning the debate, although personally I do have reservations about the view. At any rate the discussion is far from being resolved and will likely continue for some time into the future.
Subscribe to:
Comments (Atom)